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Abstract 
Although the area of innovation economics dates back to the early twentieth century 
with the seminal contributions of Schumpeter (1911), it is only recently that 
governments have understood the role of a comprehensive approach towards public 
sector economics that puts innovation systems in the eye of public policy decision 
makers. Although well researched in academia in recent years, the role that innovation 
networks play in driving successful processes of innovation and entrepreneurship has 
been less understood by policy makers. Indeed, so far public policy makers have been 
concerned with the macro level of public policy in a way that has been rather 
“disconnected” from the meso level of innovation networks. Not surprisingly, overall 
strategies for innovation network formation have not been on the radar screen of public 
policy.  The academic community, on the other hand, has been devoting more attention 
to the study of innovation networks in an attempt to understand the role they play as a 
catalyst of innovation and entrepreneurship. By and large in the research community, 
the process of innovation network formation has been left rather unattended. Indeed, 
the question of how these networks are formed and what strategies can be developed 
to ignite processes of innovation network formation has been largely absent from the 
academic debate. In this article, we make a contribution in this area and present “distal 
embedding" as one of three generic innovation network formation strategies. We also 
show why “distal embedding'' is particularly well suited for emerging regions of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Our contributions lie at the macro-meso interface and 
can shed light on public policy at the macro level aiming to have a direct impact at the 
meso level of innovation network formation. 




The study of innovation networks and their role in enabling innovation and 
entrepreneurship has received considerable attention in the past decade (Uzzi 1996, 
Ahuja 2000; Podolny 2001; Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Bathelt et al 2004; Singh 2005; 
Sorenson and Stuart 2008). Other work has focused on network dynamics and 
evolution (Bresnahan and Gambardella 2004; Powell et al 2005; Newman et al 2006; 
Powell et al 2010; Ahrweiler2010).  
 
Although there is today wide agreement on the importance of innovation networks for 
the success of innovation processes and entrepreneurship in knowledge-intensive 
industries, as recently documented by two of the most comprehensive studies of the 
networks of Silicon Valley (Ferrary and Granovetter 2009; Castilla et. al. 2000), 
considerably less attention has been devoted to the problem of innovation network 
formation (Kogut 2000; Casper 2007).  
 
In this article, we make a contribution in this area by presenting “distal embedding” as a 
generic innovation network formation strategy. In Section 2, we begin by presenting 
evidence compiled by Ferrari and Granovetter (2009) showing the importance of such 
innovation networks, in particular the important role of venture capital firms in driving 
successful innovation and entrepreneurship processes. In Section 3, we present the 
comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian model of public sector economics, the CNSE 
model put forth by Hanusch and Pyka (2007). In Section 4, we present the usual 
structural gaps of emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship and analyze 
these gaps using the public, financial and industry pillars of the CNSE model. In 
Section 5, we present distal embedding as an innovation network formation strategy 
and a model for implementing it. In Section 6, we describe some ad-hoc prior 
implementations of the distal embedding strategy. Though also applicable in robust 
regions of innovation and entrepreneurship, distal embedding is particularly well suited 
for emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship with the gaps described in 
Section 4. In Section 7, we present our conclusions and plans for future work. 
2. An empirical study of the innovation networks of Silicon 
Valley 
The empirical study conducted by Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) of the innovation 
networks in Silicon Valley has been one of the most comprehensive studies of complex 
technology innovation networks. Complexity in innovation network is defined in terms 
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of the heterogeneity of the network, that is, the diversity of nodes with different 
functions in the network, and the multiplexity of its actors, that is, the different functions 
and roles a node can play in the network. In its empirical study, Ferrary and 
Granovetter consider that  “complex networks show self-organizing behavior, that is, 
systemic behavior emerges dynamically through heterarchical multiplex interactions of 
agents in the network, and they also show resilient behavior, that is, they can withstand 
perturbations of the environment and keep its current functions or adapt to changing 
external conditions via learning, anticipation and innovation processes.” In Table 1, we 
present the main results of Ferrary and Granovetter’s empirical study. 
Table 1: The role of VCs in complex innovation networks 
Role Importance Characteristics 
Financing Essential to survive and accelerate 
growth during the first phases of 
the financial life cycle, from early-
stage VC funding up to and 
through IPO. It also provides 
indirect funding to other nodes in 
the network 
Exposure to high risk of the VC 
industry is mitigated by a complex 
structure of the network where deal 
syndication among “co-opeting'' 
VCs plays a major role in reducing 
this risk and enabling the VC 
industry 
Selection VCs select start-ups long before 
the market can and play a key role 
in choosing what start-ups will 
survive 
Selection saves resources 
because only a small percentage 
of start-ups get funded 
Signaling VC funding does not guarantee 
success but sends a signal to other 
nodes in the network to interact 
with a VC-funded start-up 
Start-ups that fail to raise funding 
from reputable VCs will 
compromise their chances to 
interact with other agents in the 
network 
Learning VC partners accumulate and 
diffuse knowledge that is relevant 
to make start-ups successful 
Most entrepreneurs have no prior 
business and managerial 
experience 
Embedding A start-up that receives funding 
from a reputable VC gets 
embedded in the network 
VC's multiplexity allows start-ups to 
get ``embedded'' in complex 
technology innovation networks 
Source: Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) 
The empirical study conducted by Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) paid special 
attention to the multiplex roles that the Silicon Valley venture capital industry plays in 
technology innovation and entrepreneurship in knowledge-intensive industries and 
unveiled the role of the venture capital industry in enabling innovation and 
entrepreneurship processes that have led to the creation of world-class companies in 
knowledge-intensive industries.  
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This study not only corroborated the complexity of the networks in Silicon Valley but 
also unveiled the important role venture capitalists play in these networks.  
Indeed, venture capital firms in Silicon Valley are among the most complex nodes of 
Silicon Valley's innovation networks when it comes to complex network theory (CNT) 
measures such as betweenness centrality in the innovation network. The study also 
showed that venture capitalists play a multifaceted role in enabling entrepreneurship 
and creating world-class companies in knowledge-intensive industries.  
Typically, the influence of tier-1 venture capital firms in helping entrepreneurs build 
world-class companies goes far beyond the complex innovation network where these 
entrepreneurs are located. As discussed in Section 5, venture capital firms will play a 
key role in the distal embedding innovation network formation strategy we are 
advocating for in this article.  
3. The CNSE model: The need for a future orientation of the 
industrial, the financial and the public pillar 
Comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian Economics (CNSE) highlights the importance of 
the innovation and future orientation not only for the industrial sector in an economy but 
also for the financial and the public sector.  
 
Without an adequate future orientation of the public sector the innovation activities of 
the industrial sector as well as the supply of resources from the financial sector are not 
sufficient to persistently spur economic growth and development.  
Without doubt the field of entrepreneurial activities can be considered as an application 
par excellence for the CNSE approach. So far in the literature the decisive bottleneck 
made responsible for low or even missing entrepreneurial activities is malfunctioning or 
absent venture capital.  
However, even a highly developed and efficient venture capital industry cannot 
compensate for deficits in the environment of the most innovative entrepreneurial 
companies. Innovation processes, in particular in knowledge-intensive industries, are 
characterized by a high degree of complexity.  
On the one hand, single firms are hardly able to master all relevant technologies but 
have to focus on their core competences and the organization of the “interfaces” to 
exploit complementarities with the competences of other actors. On the other hand, 
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innovation processes aimed at different industries are extremely time consuming. This 
long-term nature of the innovation processes requires for innovative firms to be 
embedded in stable network relationships with a heterogeneous set of partners 
comprising public research institutes, universities, small and large companies, venture 
capital firms – to name but a few.  
For the public sector these complex innovation processes need an embedding 
environment for entrepreneurial activities with a pronounced future orientation, 
acknowledging the uncertainties of innovation and keeping in mind the long-term 
nature despite short-term cost considerations.  
Obviously, in the creation of this environment the public sector can play an active role 
as network trigger and network enhancer (Schön and Pyka, 2012). In many instances, 
however, such an environment cannot be created, at least not in the short run, 
because of missing institutions, scarcity in (knowledge and financial) resources and a 
missing critical mass.   
From this a vicious circle emerges because the low performance of entrepreneurial 
activities does not spur economic growth, which leads to a shortage in resources to 
create the required institutions to support entrepreneurial activities (Saviotti and Pyka, 
2011).  
In order to get out of this unholy alliance of missing future-oriented institutions and the 
shortage of resources leading to the inability to set up innovative new sectors by 
entrepreneurial activities, the public sector can drastically enhance its future orientation 
by adopting a Keokuk strategy that we have termed distal embedding. We explain this 
strategy in detail in Section 5. In Section 4, we outline the typical gaps found in 
emerging regions of innovation at the three pillars of the CNSE model. 
4. Emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship 
In analyzing emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship using the CNSE 
model, we often come across many of the characteristics shown in Table 2. 
Typically, the gaps at the three pillars of the CNSE model, as introduced in Hanusch 
and Pyka (2007), have a compounded effect that prevents the innovations systems of 
these regions from adopting a future orientation approach. From a CNSE perspective, 
only the coordinated effort at the level of these three pillars can help overcome the 
problems associated with some of the gaps shown in Table 2. The process of bridging 
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these gaps requires a long-term effort at the level of these three pillars though and is 
difficult to implement. 
Table 2: Characteristics of emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship 
Public Pillar Industry Pillar Financial Pillar 
Low percentage of GDP 
invested in R&D 
Low private investments in 
R&D 
Lack of local venture 
capital industry 
Low standards and no 
future orientation of the 
educational system 
Lack of local talent in 
strategic technology 
management 
No “enabling assets” that 
may attract investment of 
foreign VCs locally 
Few and far between 
publicly-funded world-class 
applied R&D centers 




Investors used to high 
returns from investments in 
traditional industries 
R&D policies that 
encourage traditional push 
technology transfer models 
Inbound industry 
innovation as opposed to 
outbound industry 
innovation strategy 
Investor community focus 
on (financial) efficiency 
and not on effectiveness 
Innovation policies favoring 
public investment in local 
non-knowledge-intensive 
industries following a 
reactive approach to 
exogenous factors 
No best legal and 
consulting practices 
around IP management 
and transfer, corporate 
development, marketing 
and business development 
Lack of local technology 
investment funds and no 
enabling assets that may 
attract foreign technology 
investment funds to invest 
in the region 
Innovation policies 
promoting academic staff 
without world-class 
industry experience into 
management positions in 
the national innovation 
system 
Lack of managerial talent 
that can bridge the gap 
between university base 
and applied R&D and 
early-stage technology 
management 
Poor high-quality deal flow 
arising out of the local 
region of innovation and 
entrepreneurship 
Policies that require 
investing in innovation 
agendas for domestic 
clients only 
Small domestic market 
and/or lack of access to 
world-class clients 
Lack of client funding for 
innovative projects 
 
Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) argue that due to the systemic nature of complex 
innovation networks, the presence or absence of a few types of nodes in the network, 
especially those highly connected in the network, can seriously compromise the 
functioning of the network. Even though complex networks show particular resilience to 
changing conditions in the environment, the removal of highly connected nodes in the 
network can cause systemic failure (Newman et. al. 2006; Callaway et. al. 2000).  
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Even though we could argue that the innovation systems in many countries of 
emerging economies present less serious gaps than those presented in Table 2, the 
situation in which these countries are left is not radically different from the one in which 
countries presenting some or all the gaps in Table 2 are. Even for countries of 
emerging economies presenting less gaps in their national innovation systems, the 
task of closing these gaps and building complex innovation networks such as Silicon 
Valley is not feasible in the short and mid term.  
With this in mind, we proceed to describe distal embedding as a network formation 
strategy that can be applied by countries of emerging economies to bridge these gaps 
in the short and mid term. 
5. Distal embedding as an innovation network formation 
strategy 
If we take the position that entrepreneurship and innovation in knowledge-intensive 
industries is a process that is not only determined by the entrepreneur Schumpeter 
(1911) and that the success or failure of innovation and entrepreneurship in these 
industries is primarily the result of multiplex interactions among diverse nodes in a 
complex innovation network, then the problem of network formation and the embedding 
of economic actors in those networks should become the main priority of actors in the 
public, finance and industry pillar of the CNSE model we briefly introduced in Section 4, 
which is  described in detail in (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007).  
In fact, the importance of developing a sound strategy for innovation network formation 
and the embedding of the actors in the three CNSE pillars should be a top priority for 
emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship.   
The discussion of embeddedness in social structures and its impact on economic 
outcomes, originally raised in the seminal work of Granovetter in connection with the 
study of labor markets (Milgram 1967; Granovetter1973) and later expanded to other 
areas of economic life (Granovetter 1985; Granovetter 2005} pervades today a number 
of other areas in the social sciences. In particular, innovation and entrepreneurship is 
poised to benefit from a better understanding of the importance of complex innovation 
networks and the role they play in the outcomes of innovation processes (Uzzi 1996; 
Ahuja 2000; Podolny 2001; Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Bathelt et al 2004; Bresnahan 
and Gambardella 2004; Powell et al 2005; Powell et al 2010; Singh 2005; Sorenson 
and Stuart 2008; Ahrweiler 2010).     
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Our working assumption is that the national innovation systems of countries of 
emerging economies will present a range of gaps that will make it unfeasible for them 
to build complex innovation networks in the short and mid term. Without loosing 
generality, many of the gaps presented in Table 2 are shared by a wide variety of 
regions of innovation and entrepreneurship in many countries, even in highly 
developed countries.  
We put forward the term “distal embedding'' to denote the embedding of nodes of 
emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship, that is, those regions that do not 
present the complexity required for innovation processes in knowledge-intensive 
industries to succeed, in innovation networks of “distant” regions of innovation and 
entrepreneurship that do present the complexity required.  
It should be noted that distance in this context has a connotation that goes beyond 
geographic location and is to be construed as a measure of propinquity, as this term is 
defined in social and organizational psychology (Festinger et al 1950). 
5.1 Emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship 
Table 3 presents a subset of characteristics of an emerging region of innovation and 
entrepreneurship posing a major challenge for the implementation of robust innovation 
network formation strategy. 
Emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship will typically have some of the 
characteristics described in Table 3. In these regions, the success of outbound 
innovation strategies, that is, strategies that orient themselves towards the creation of 
world-class technology companies exporting to the global technology absorption 
markets, will be severely impaired. In regions with the characteristics shown in Table 3, 
there is a natural bias towards implementing inbound innovation strategies, that is, 
strategies oriented at importing product and services developed in more developed 
countries. Using this inbound innovation strategy, the most innovative companies in the 
emerging regions of innovation and entrepreneurship tend to position themselves as 
value-added resellers and channel partners of leading foreign technology companies, 
helping them introduce their offerings in the domestic markets. Although in many of 
these emerging regions some of these companies can grow into large corporations 
using this strategy, few of them have attempted to adopt a peacefully co-existing 
outbound innovation strategy via the creation of business lines with offerings that can 
be exported to global markets. 
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Table 3: An emerging region of innovation and entrepreneurship 




Disincentives for managers 
to pursue technical track 
record of excellence 
Lack of local venture 
capital industry 
Secondary and tertiary 
education has been largely 
privatized and left without 
future orientation 
Lack of managerial talent 
in technology innovation 
both in industry and 
academia 
Local investors not 
exposed to innovation 
processes of world-class 
innovation networks 
Low investment in R&D as 
percentage of GDP 
Risk-averse industry elite Local investors not 
exposed to world-class 
technology management 
Market failures regarding 
innovation remain largely 
unaddressed 
Industry elite not used to 
competing through 
innovation 
Local investors manage 
new ventures in 
knowledge-intensive 
industries as if they were 
managing new ventures in 
traditional industries  
Most of the companies that attempt an outbound innovation strategy will typically fail 
due to lack of access to key enabling assets that are only available in complex 
technology innovation networks. Distal embedding is an innovation network formation 
strategy that can help entrepreneurs from emerging regions of innovation and 
entrepreneurship circumvent this problem. 
5.2 The distal embedding process 
The process of distal embedding is shown in Figure 1. The distal embedding strategy 
consists in “embedding” a node of an emerging innovation network (EIN) in a complex 
innovation network (CIN). For the strategy to function a so-called “embedding node" 
needs to exist in the CIN and the proper incentives need to be articulated by the EIN in 
order for the distal embedding to take place.  
This strategy overcomes the problems that pervade EINs by way of allowing nodes 
embedded in EINs to access key enabling assets that are only available in CINs. In 
Figure 1, we borrow the diagram of the CIN from Ferrary and Granovetter (2009), a 
diagram that they use to describe the heterogeneity of the complex technology 
innovation networks of Silicon Valley. 
In Figure 1, we introduce a special node, the so-called “embedding node,” to perform 
the so-called “embedding function,” the key function underlying this strategy. 
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Figure 1: The process of distal embedding  
5.3 Embedding nodes and their properties 
A node embedded in a CIN can qualify as embedding node to the extent that it meets 
the following key criteria. The distal embedding strategy we are advocating for in this 
article is based on finding and engaging a suitable “embedding node” in the CIN and 
characterizing a compelling “embedding function.”  
Embedding nodes are a very special kind of node in a complex innovation network. To 
qualify as such, a potential embedding node needs to satisfy very peculiar conditions. 
Unlike VCs, embedding nodes do not typically have strong ties to a wide variety of 
nodes in the CIN, although weak ties may exist to many of them. Embedding nodes, 
though, must have strong ties to nodes that do possess these strong ties to other 
strongly connected nodes in the CIN, most notably to VCs or to nodes in the CIN with 
high degree of betweenness centrality. Embedding nodes typically do not provide 
financing, not in a direct way, but they can embed nodes of the EIN with nodes of the 
CIN that do provide such financing.  
Table 4 provides a summary of the important functions that embedding nodes provide 
for EINs and CINs.  
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Table 4: The role of embedding nodes 
Role EIN CIN 
Financing Embedding nodes do not fund 
nodes in the EIN but can provide 
access to nodes in the CIN that 
provide such funding, thus 
providing indirect funding to other 
nodes in the EIN 
Once distally embedded, nodes of 
the EIN become nodes of the CIN 
and the embedding nodes play a 
role in granting access to sources 
of financing to them 
Selection Embedding nodes select start-ups 
in the EIN long before distally 
embedding them in the CIN, 
identifying nodes in the EIN with 
potential for global 
competitiveness, saving 
resources in the EIN 
Distally embedded nodes undergo 
a selection process that saves 
resources in the CIN, particularly 
for VCs interested in funding start-
ups originating outside the CIN 
Signaling Distal embedding sends a signal 
to nodes in the EIN to work with 
and fund distally embedded 
nodes in the EIN 
Once distally embedded in the CIN, 
nodes become more likely to 
receive VC funding in the CIN 
Learning Embedding nodes are industry 
veterans that accumulate and 
diffuse knowledge required to 
create successful start-ups, 
providing the role of a non-
funding super angel to nodes in 
the EIN 
Embedding nodes also serve the 
process of accumulating knowledge 
about investing opportunities and 
technologies arising out of the EIN, 
diffusing this knowledge through 
the CIN 
Embedding A node from an EIN that gets 
distally embedded in the CIN by 
an embedding node gets 
embedded in the CIN 
If distally embedded, nodes from 
the EIN are more likely to receive 
VC funding in the CIN and, if 
successful in receiving it, the 
embedding will get reinforced in the 
CIN 
A necessary condition for an embedding node to qualify as such is that it has to be a 
source of influence in the CIN, typically because: (i) they have access through strong 
ties to nodes in the CIN that exert such power in the network and (ii) they can influence 
the decision-making processes made by powerful and influential nodes.  
5.4 Embedding functions 
At the core of the distal embedding strategy is the so-called embedding function. An 
embedding function is defined as a function of the embedding node that embeds nodes 
of the EIN in the CIN. The availability of such an embedding function depends on 
whether or not a “compelling value proposition” can be articulated between the 
embedding node in the CIN and the nodes in the EIN that are seeking to be embedded 
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in the CIN. In some cases, not the actors seeking such embedding provide the 
“enabling assets” for the embedding function to exist. Indeed, actors from the public or 
finance pillars such as government agencies or venture capital firms, respectively, can 
act on behalf of the actors of the EIN for which the embedding is intended and provide 
the “enabling assets” for this value proposition to be articulated.  
It should be noted that the embedding function creates a strong tie between the 
embedding node in the CIN and the embedded nodes in the EIN. Such a strong tie can 
be created only if a vested interest is created for the embedding node to engage on a 
long-term basis in the embedding process such that: (i) a high-value creation process 
ensues in the CIN, and (ii) the embedding node can capitalize upon that process of 
value creation. 
Invariably, the embedding node will need to embrace the risks associated with the ex 
ante possibility of failure and losses. This will make it necessary for the value 
proposition underlying the embedding function to provide the necessary upside 
potential for the embedding node to assume this risk. If this is not the case, a suitable 
embedding function will in all likelihood not be articulated and the embedding process 
will not be executed well or will not take place at all.  
In the next section, we survey some cases of distal embedding. In so doing, we identify 
the embedding and embedded nodes, the embedding functions and the associated 
enabling assets that led to the articulation of a compelling value proposition. Some of 
these cases of distal embedding originated in “singularity events” that gave rise to 
extraordinary enabling assets, which in turn created extremely compelling value 
propositions that led to the creation of strong embedding functions. 
6. Implementing the distal embedding strategy 
6.1 Ad hoc cases of distal embedding 
The lack of comprehensive models of distal embedding makes it not surprising at all 
that many of the cases of distal embedding observed so far have unfolded rather 
spontaneously. They have not been the result of executing a comprehensive public 
policy agenda driven by governments (public pillar), nor the result of a process of 
strategic planning and execution at the corporate level (industry pillar), nor the result of 
a coordinated effort of those actors providing financial backing (the finance pillar). 
Accordingly, we term them as ad hoc cases of distal embedding.  
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6.2 The case of Israel 
Perhaps the most salient case of distal embedding has been implemented by Israel for 
very singular reasons. Indeed, if we review the criteria in Table 3, we find out that Israel 
does not qualify as the quintessential country for a distal embedding strategy. A 
second glimpse at the singular conditions of Israel reveals that some constraints in its 
industry pillar, in conjunction with other characteristics of its public and particularly its 
finance pillars, make the distal embedding strategy an ideal strategy to circumvent the 
shortcoming of Israel's national innovation system. Table 5 summarizes some of the 
conditions of the national innovation system in Israel. 
Table 5: The singular conditions of Israel 
Public Pillar Industry Pillar Financial Pillar 
High percentage of GDP 
invested in R&D 
Low private investments in 
R&D 
World’s highest per-capita 
venture capital spending 
Future orientation of 
educational system 
Lack of local talent in 
strategic technology 
management 
No assets that may attract 
investment of foreign VCs 
locally 
Several publicly-funded 
world-class applied R&D 
centers 
Industry elite is used to 
competing through 
innovation practices 
Investors used to high 
returns from investments in 
non-traditional industries 
R&D policies that 
encourage traditional push 




transitioning from a focus 
on efficiency to a focus on 
effectiveness 
Innovation policies favoring 
public investment in local 
knowledge-intensive 
industries following a 
proactive approach 
Some mass of legal and 
consulting practices 
around IP management 
and transfer, corporate 
development, marketing 
and business development 
Local technology 
investment funds are 
plentiful but the lack of 
other enabling assets has 
prevented foreign 
technology investment 
funds from investing in the 
region 
Innovation policies 
promoting investment in 
applied R&D through open 
innovation 
Small domestic market 
and/or lack of access to 
world-class clients 
High-quality deal flow 
arising out of the local 
region of innovation and 
entrepreneurship but 
lack of funding of 
innovative projects by 
local clients 
Israel holds one of the world's highest per-capita VC funding rates and one of the 
world's highest rates of investment in R&D, has a number of world-class R&D centers 
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producing cutting-edge IPs, and has invested in a local environment where technology 
entrepreneurship and innovation thrive. From this perspective, Israel is quite a 
departure from the situation of most countries of emerging economies. Indeed, Israel's 
would be in all likelihood very well positioned to execute other innovation network 
formation strategies such as replication and local embedding, both of which are 
described elsewhere (Paredes-Frigolett and Pyka, 2012), if it were not for some very 
singular conditions that make such course of action untenable. In fact, Israel's need for 
a distal embedding strategy stems from its geopolitical location, the lack of a large 
domestic technology absorption market, and the lack of access to requirements from 
world-class customers in key vertical markets. 
The implementation of distal embedding executed by Israel is also somewhat singular 
in that the distal embedding process did not take place initially by identifying an 
embedding node in a complex innovation network. In the absence of such an 
embedding node, many Israeli start-ups attempted a process of “self-embedding,” 
which by definition is an impossibility. Indeed, since most Israeli start-ups realized very 
early on in the innovation life cycle the need to access the largest technology 
absorption markets, they “disembarked” in complex innovation networks such as the 
“128 corridor” around Boston or Silicon Valley in the Bay area in an attempt to get 
themselves “self-embedded” in those networks.  
In so doing, they have been financially backed by VCs based in Israel, which for all 
intent and purposes assumed the role of embedding nodes in our model. Not being 
themselves embedded in those complex networks, Israeli VCs did not qualify as 
suitable embedding nodes. As a result, no embedding functions could be articulated 
and the distal embedding process could not take place.   
Most successful technology start-ups in Israel were initially funded by local VCs in the 
EIN (Israel). Israeli VCs are insofar a rare breed as they have specialized themselves 
in funding early-stage deals, which in complex innovation networks such as Silicon 
Valley has long become a relic of the past. Given the need for distal embedding, local 
VCs in the EIN typically incorporate subsidiaries in a CIN such as Silicon Valley, 
keeping R&D, engineering and back-office operations locally in the EIN.  
Unfortunately, this indirect process does not distally embed the U.S. subsidiaries of 
Israeli start-ups in the CIN. As a result, Israeli start-ups, and the VC that backed them, 
engaged in a long and tedious process of establishing and nurturing ties with other 
actors in complex innovation networks such as Silicon Valley on their own. For the 
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great majority of them this process did not yield results because of the lack of an 
“embedding node” actively engaged in the distal embedding process throughout the 
innovation life cycle in the CIN.  
Despite the lack of a successful distal embedding strategy, the large number of Israeli 
start-ups financially backed by local (Israeli) VCs with the potential to become world-
class companies has had such a critical mass that Israel, in particular its local VCs 
community, has been able to produce some compelling cases of technology 
companies that have gone public in NASDAQ and have become world leaders. 
Another factor that has contributed to this process of establishing those ties is the 
compelling flow of “fundable deals” arising out of Israel.   
These singular events combined have attracted the attention of tier-1 VCs in Silicon 
Valley in such a way that strong ties between these two communities have begun to 
emerge. This has contributed to the creation of ties between the local VC community in 
Israel and tier-1 VCs in Silicon Valley. As a result, and after a long process that 
unfolded over the last two decades, the conditions for distal embedding have only now 
begun to emerge to a point where the process of distal embedding of start-ups 
financially backed by Israeli VCs can now be attempted in a more systematic way 
along the lines of the model outlined in this article.  
From the perspective of our distal embedding model, the rise of highly visible and 
successful technology companies out of Israel and the compelling flow of “fundable 
deals” arising out of that region constitute the enabling assets that Israel has been able 
to develop in order to articulate a compelling value proposition for the embedding 
nodes.  
In this case, the embedding nodes correspond to tier-1 VCs in complex innovation 
networks such as Silicon Valley. The embedded nodes correspond to the Israeli VCs 
themselves and, through them, the Israeli start-ups they fund. The embedding function 
in this case is achieved through a process of deal syndication, with the Israeli VCs 
providing seed, angel and super angel funding in the EIN and then syndicating a series 
A round of equity financing later on in the financial life cycle in the CIN. This process is 
typically accomplished through a subsidiary incorporated in the U.S. with the Israeli VC 
acting as lead investor. The Israeli VC then syndicates the deal with a tier-1 VC in the 
U.S, which in turn acts as accompanying investor. From then on, the process continues 
as usual, with other rounds of equity financing being syndicated by both the Israeli and 
the local VC in the CIN. After the first series A round, the tier-1 VC in the complex 
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innovation network assumes the role of lead investor in subsequent rounds of funding. 
So in the particular case of Israel, the embedding of Israeli VCs through strong ties to 
tier-1 VCs in places such as Silicon Valley constitutes the “enabling asset” that makes 
distal embedding a viable strategy for Israel today. 
6.3 Another ad-hoc case of distal embedding 
Another singular case of distal embedding emerged spontaneously in the ITC industry 
in connection with the millennium bug. In this case, the distal embedding followed a 
pattern similar to the one described in Figure 1. In this case, the Big 5 consulting 
companies provided the embedding node.1 Through this process of distal embedding, 
enterprise software vendors that operated regionally throughout the nineties such as 
SAP became global leaders in a relatively short period of time. This example shows the 
importance of embedding nodes for the successful execution of the distal embedding 
process.  
In this second case, the embedding nodes not only did exert strong influence on the 
purchasing decisions of the largest corporations in tier-1 markets in North America, 
EMEA and APAC but also in tier-1 markets in Latin America. At the same time, they 
had a vested interest in the success of the embedding function. The embedding 
function, on the other hand, did require a change in the revenue model of emerging 
enterprise software vendors such as SAP. 
Prior to this successful case of distal embedding, the revenue model of the world’s 
largest enterprise software vendors consisted in selling software licenses and 
professional services. The need of the embedded nodes (the enterprise software 
vendors) to characterize a compelling value proposition for the embedding nodes (the 
Big 5 consulting firms) did require a change in the revenue model of the vendors. This 
was a necessary component of the value proposition in order for the embedding nodes 
to have a vested interest in executing the embedding function. 
Some enterprise software vendors with already established consulting organizations as 
their main source of revenues were unwilling to relinquish the consulting revenue 
source by adopting the new revenue model. Other smaller vendors did adopt the new 
revenue model and were therefore able to create a compelling value proposition for the                                                         1 This is a term used to refer to the largest professional services firms that provide consulting 
services in strategy and management, including ITC strategy and execution, to the largest 
corporations of the world. 
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embedding nodes, that is, for the Big 5 consulting companies. With such distal 
embedding function in place, the embedding nodes did actively engage and 
successfully execute a distal embedding function for these smaller vendors.  
It is interesting to note that smaller enterprise software vendors did have an advantage 
over larger vendors in the U.S. due to the dilemma of creative destruction. With a large 
consulting organization in place actively engaged in deployments in the largest ITC 
absorption markets, established companies in the enterprise software market did face 
the dilemma of destroying a successful revenue model and change their organizational 
structure in order to accommodate the requirements of the Big 5 consulting firms. 
Smaller vendors were more prone to accepting a change in the revenue model and 
were therefore able to characterize a compelling value proposition for the Big 5 
consulting firms, which led to a process of creative destruction in the entire enterprise 
software industry. 
 
Through this process of distal embedding, smaller enterprise software vendors were 
able to have access for the first time to requirements of large corporations in the 
world’s largest technology absorption markets. In a way, this not only provided access 
to client financing but also to requirements from world-class clients in regions of 
innovation that were not easily accessible to them prior to this process of distal 
embedding. The embedding nodes, that is, the Big 5 consulting firms, did deploy vast 
resources through their subsidiaries in these tier-1 technology absorption markets, 
providing de facto not only a vast consultative sales force throughout the world to 
qualify and close very large license deals for the vendors but also execution power in 
order to successfully deploy large enterprise software integration projects at the world’s 
largest corporations, rendering them key reference accounts in the process.  
7. Conclusions 
In this article, we have described distal embedding as one of three generic innovation 
network formation strategies (Paredes-Frigolett and Pyka, 2012). This work 
characterizes the process of embedding of nodes in innovation networks as the central 
element towards innovation network formation.  
As argued by other researchers, the complexity of innovation networks or lack thereof 
is one of the key elements that impacts on the chances of success of processes of 
innovation and entrepreneurship taking place in such networks. Unlike other research 
in this area, we have focused not on the study of such networks but on the rather 
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elusive problem of how the process of innovation network formation takes place. Part 
of our work focuses on generic strategies that can be implemented in order to increase 
the chances of success of innovation processes taking place in innovation networks 
lacking the necessary complexity. 
As mentioned, the concept of embedding plays a central role in this connection. 
Indeed, the possibility of a node embedded in an emerging region of innovation and 
entrepreneurship to effectively get embedded in a complex innovation network is a key 
factor in our model that plays a central role in determining the economic outcome of an 
innovation process.  
The process of distal embedding, as defined in this article, is not only interesting for 
emerging regions of innovation an entrepreneurship of developing countries, especially 
those that are not endowed with local assets to successfully enable and execute a 
process of local embedding, as described by Paredes-Frigolett and Pyka (2012). Distal 
embedding can also be used in regions of innovation and entrepreneurship of 
developed countries. The second case of distal embedding described in Section 6 is a 
good example of this.  
Albeit in an ad hoc way, this second case of distal embedding took place in one of the 
most industrialized regions of Europe, a region that is notorious for having formed 
some highly complex innovation networks in several industries. This case followed 
closely the model of distal embedding we introduced in Section 5. It is interesting to 
note that once all the components had been put in place for the embedding function to 
be characterized and executed, the distal embedding process unfolded rapidly and 
produced high-impact results in relatively short period of time. In the case of software 
vendors such as SAP, the results were of such magnitude that the company became a 
world-class company and eventually the world’s largest enterprise software vendor in 
less than a decade.  
The distal embedding process executed by Israel did not follow the model proposed in 
this article. In the absence of a proper embedding node and an associated embedding 
function, distal embedding could not take place initially. This can be characterized as a 
brute force approach to distal embedding that in the end has proven to be successful 
due to the continuous investment of the finance and private pillars in the Israeli 
innovation system over a long period of more than two decades, on the one hand, and 
some singular events and conditions of the innovation systems in Israel that are very 
unique difficult to replicate, on the other. 
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In the second case of distal embedding discussed in Section 6, the engagement of an 
embedding node, in this case comprised of the global consulting organizations of the 
Big 5 consulting firms, caused the process of distal embedding to occur in a relatively 
short period of time, mobilized and leveraged enormous resources located outside the 
network in which the organization being embedded was located, and effected a 
transition of the embedded company from being a regional player in the DACH region2 
to becoming the world’s largest enterprise software vendor in less than a decade. 
 
While the examples above did not follow a systematic approach to distal embedding 
but rather unfolded spontaneously, they demonstrate the feasibility of distal embedding 
as a process of innovation network formation. The second case, in particular, is the 
quintessential manifestation of an ad hoc distal embedding process. Even though this 
process did not follow a systematic model of distal embedding, this second case 
exemplifies the impact that a process of distal embedding can have on the economic 
outcomes of an innovation process. The magnitude of the success of this second case 
was predicated on the magnitude of the singular event that gave rise to its process of 
distal embedding. 
 
We might argue that the actors involved in these cases of distal embedding were 
unaware of what mechanism was at work and how this mechanism operated, although 
they were very much aware of the results this mechanism was producing. But these 
successful cases of distal embedding prove that there is a mechanism at work behind 
the embedding. 
We claim that there is method behind the magic of distal embedding and that 
technology companies from both robust and emerging regions of innovation can benefit 
from understanding how the process of distal embedding works and how a distal 
embedding strategy can be implemented and executed. 
Current and future work consists in putting forward a comprehensive framework of 
innovation network formation based on generic innovation network formation strategies 
(Paredes-Frigolett and Pyka, 2012) and in developing a biologically inspired general 
theory of innovation network formation (Paredes-Frigolett, 2012). 
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